Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games

John F. Nash

Every finite game has at least one equilibrium point at which no player can gain by changing strategy alone, proved in barely two pages using a fixed-point theorem.

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If this is the wrong level

Too hard? Start hereGame Theory with Ben PolakBen Polak (YaleCourses), 2008Derives game theory from played examples rather than notation, showing that most strategic mistakes come from failing to put yourself in the other player's position.Too easy? Go hereNon-Cooperative GamesJohn F. Nash, 1951Proves, via Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, that every finite non-cooperative game has at least one equilibrium point in mixed strategies, and develops equilibrium as the general solution concept the 1950 note only sketched.

Groundwork for

Works in the library that name this one as a prerequisite.

The Logic of Animal ConflictJohn Maynard Smith & George R. Price, 1973Shows why animal contests are usually settled by ritual display rather than lethal force, by defining an evolutionarily stable strategy that cannot be invaded once it is common.

Filed under Game Theory & Mechanism Design in Economics.