Project SherlockEst. Knowledge

Paper

1981

The Evolution of Cooperation

Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton

Shows, via a computer tournament and an evolutionary model, that a simple reciprocal strategy, tit-for-tat, can invade a population of non-cooperators and remain stable once established.

Before you start

FreeAdvancedlink checked 17 Sept 2026

If this is the wrong level

Too hard? Start hereThe Evolution of TrustNicky Case, 2017An interactive walk through Axelrod's tournament and the iterated prisoner's dilemma, showing why tit-for-tat strategies let cooperation emerge, spread, and collapse under different rules of the game.

Groundwork for

Works in the library that name this one as a prerequisite.

Five Rules for the Evolution of CooperationMartin A. Nowak, 2006Sets out five distinct mechanisms - kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection - by which cooperation can be favoured despite its cost to the cooperator.

Filed under Game Theory & Mechanism Design in Economics.