The Nature of the Firm
Ronald Coase
Firms exist because using the market has transaction costs; the boundary of the firm sits where those costs balance.
20 pageslink checked 17 Sept 2026Competition, market power and antitrust — oligopoly, entry barriers, network effects, and how platforms changed the questions.
9 topics · 9 curated works
Assumes you know the vocabulary.
The Nature of the Firm
Ronald Coase · 1937
Firms exist because using the market has transaction costs; the boundary of the firm sits where those costs balance.
+1 more at this level
Primary sources and full treatments.
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth
Augustin Cournot · 1838
Models rival sellers choosing output simultaneously and shows their equilibrium sits between the competitive and monopoly outcomes, founding the…
+6 more at this level
9 works
Ronald Coase
Firms exist because using the market has transaction costs; the boundary of the firm sits where those costs balance.
20 pageslink checked 17 Sept 2026George J. Stigler
Regulation is typically acquired by the industry it targets and designed to work in that industry's interest, not the public's — regulatory capture as the normal case rather than the failure case.
19 pageslink checked 17 Sept 2026Augustin Cournot
Models rival sellers choosing output simultaneously and shows their equilibrium sits between the competitive and monopoly outcomes, founding the mathematical analysis of oligopoly a century before game theory existed.
link checked 17 Sept 2026Kenneth Arrow
Argues competitive markets will systematically underinvest in invention because information, once created, is cheap to copy and hard for its inventor to fully capture the value of.
link checked 17 Sept 2026Avinash K. Dixit
Shows an incumbent can deter entry by committing to capacity or capital that makes aggressive post-entry competition credible, so the threat works only when the investment is genuinely irreversible.
link checked 17 Sept 2026Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro
Shows that when a technology's value rises with its number of users, sponsorship and expectations management by firms — not just technical merit — decide which standard a market adopts.
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole
Extends two-sided market theory past a single fixed platform, examining how competition between rival platforms and their pricing to each side changes once users can join more than one.
link checked 17 Sept 2026Oliver E. Williamson
Argues the boundary of the firm is set by comparing the transaction costs of governing an exchange through markets, hierarchies or hybrid contracts, with asset specificity as the key variable that pushes a transaction inside the firm.
link checked 17 Sept 2026Carl Shapiro
Argues the 2010 revision replaced a single-minded focus on market definition and concentration with a toolkit of competitive-effects evidence, reflecting how merger review is actually practised rather than how the 1982 guidelines said it should be.
link checked 17 Sept 2026